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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a two-way relay network where two sources can communicate only
through an untrusted intermediate relay, and investigate the physical layer security issue of this two-
way relay scenario. Specifically, we treat the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the
information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept secret, despite the fact that its cooperation in
relaying this information is essential. We indicate that a non-zero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in
this two-way relay network even without external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly
jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain that the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively
improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a
Stackelberg game model between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme
to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole
buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming
power and the asking prices are given and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stakelberg
equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulations results verify the properties
and the efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg game based scheme.
This work is partially supported by US NSF CNS-0910401, CNS-0905556, and CNS-0953377.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally security in wireless networks has been mainly considered at higher layers
using cryptographic methods. However, recent advances in wireless decentralized and ad-hoc
networking have led to an increasing attention on studying physical layer based security. The
basic idea of physical layer security is to exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless
channel to provide secure communication. The security is quantified by the secrecy capacity,
which is defined as the maximum rate of reliable information sent from the source to the
intended destination in the presence of eavesdroppers. This line of work was pioneered by
Aaron Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel and established fundamental results of
creating perfectly secure communications without relying on private keys [1]. Wyner showed
that when the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the source
and the destination can exchange perfectly secure messages at a non-zero rate. In follow-up
work [2], the secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap channel was studied, and in [3] Wyner’s
approach was extended to the transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels.
Recently, researches on physical layer security have generalized these studies to wireless
fading channels [4]–[7], MIMO channels [8]–[12], and various multiple access scenarios
[13]–[18].
Motivated the fact that if the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-
destination channel, the perfect secrecy capacity will be zero [3], some recent work has
been proposed to overcome this limitation using relay cooperation, which mainly consists of
cooperative relaying [19], [20], and cooperative jamming [21], [22]. For instance, in [19] and
[20], the authors proposed effective decode-and-forward (DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF)
based cooperative relaying protocols for physical layer security, respectively. Cooperative
jamming is another approach to improve the secrecy capacity by distracting the eavesdropper
with codewords independent of the source messages. In [21] and [22], several cooperative
jamming schemes were investigated for different scenarios, where classical relay strategies
fail to offer positive performance gains. Relay channel with confidential messages was studied
in [23] and [24], where the relay node acts both as an eavesdropper and a helper. In [25],
it was established that cooperation even with an untrusted relay node could be beneficial
in relay channels with orthogonal components. Then in [26], the authors considered a two-
hop communication system using an untrusted relay and showed that a cooperative jammer
enables a positive secrecy capacity which would be otherwise impossible.
Two-way communication is a common scenario where two terminals transmit information
to each other simultaneously. Recently, the two-way relay channel [27]–[31] has attracted
lots of interest from both academic and industrial communities due to its advantage in saving
3bandwidth efficiently. In [27] and [28], both AF and DF protocols for one-way relay channels
were extended to general full-duplex discrete two-way relay channel and half-duplex Gaussian
two-way relay channel, respectively. In [29], different relay strategies consisting of AF, DF,
and EF (estimate-and-forword) for uncoded two-way relay channels were investigated. In [30],
analogue network coding based two-way relay channel with linear processing was analyzed
and an optimal relay beamforming structure was presented. In [31], a joint network-channel
coding was proposed for the two-way relay channel, where channel codes are used at both
the sources and a network code is used at the intermediate relay. Although two-way relay
networks have received so much attention so far, the security issue about the relay, especially
from the physical layer security point of view, has not been well investigated.
To improve the security in two-way relay channel, distributed protocols are desired. Game
theory [32] offers a formal analytical framework with a set of mathematical tools to study
the complex interactions among interdependent rational players. Recently, there has been
significant growth in research activities that use game theory for analyzing communica-
tion networks, mainly due to the need for developing autonomous, distributed, and flexible
mobile networks where the network devices can make independent and rational strategic
decisions, as well as the need for low complexity distributed algorithms for competitive or
collaborative scenarios [33]. In [34] and [35], the authors introduced some recent studies
on signal processing and communication networks using game theory. In [36] and [37], the
authors employed game theory to physical layer security to study the interaction between the
source and the jammers who assist the source by distracting the eavesdropper, and got some
distributed game solutions. For two-way relay networks, it is desirable to study the physical
layer security problems with the aid of game theory similar to those for one-way relay cases.
In this paper, we investigate physical layer security issues in a two-way relay network with
friendly jammers. The two sources can exchange information only through an untrusted relay,
as there is no direct communication link between them. The untrusted AF relay acts as both
an essential relay and a malicious eavesdropper that has the incentive to eavesdrop on the
information transmission. For convenience and ease of comparison, we first study the system
without friendly jammers as a special case. We find that a non-zero secrecy rate here is
indeed available even without the help of friendly jammers. We also derive an optimal power
vector of the relay and the sources by maximizing the secrecy rate. We further investigate
the two-way relay secure communication with friendly jammers, and find that a positive gain
can be obtained in the secrecy rate by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly
jammers. Then the problem comes to how to effectively utilize the jamming power from
different friendly jammers to maximize the secrecy rate. Thus, we propose a Stackelberg
4game model between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme. In the
defined game, the sources pay the friendly jammers for interfering the untrusted relay in order
to increase the secrecy rate, while the friendly jammers charge the sources with a certain
price for their service of jamming. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power
and the asking prices are given and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stakelberg
equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Furthermore, a centralized scheme is also
proposed for comparison with the distributed Stackelberg game based scheme. Finally, the
proposed approaches and solutions are verified by simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model of two-way
relay communication with friendly jammers is described and the corresponding secrecy rate
is formulated. In Section III, a two-way relay system without jammers as a special case is
investigated. In Section IV, we define a Stackelberg type of buyer/seller game to investigate
the interaction between the sources and the friendly jammers, and analyze the optimization
problem of physical layer security in the presence of friendly jammers. Simulation results
are provided in Section V, and the conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a basic two-way relay network consisting of two source
nodes, one untrusted relay node, and N friendly jammer nodes, which are denoted by Sk, k =
1, 2, R, and Ji, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , respectively. We denote by N the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , N}.
All the nodes here are equipped with only a single omni-directional antenna and operate in
a half-duplex way, i.e., each node cannot receive and transmit simultaneously. Then the
complete transmission can be divided into two phases. During the first phase, shown with
solid lines, both source nodes transmit their information to the relay node. Simultaneously, the
friendly jammers also transmit the jamming signals in order to distract the malicious relay. In
the second phase, shown with dashed lines, the relay node broadcasts a combined version of
the received signals to both source nodes. Note that in the system we investigate there is only
one intermediate relay and we assume that no direct link exists between the two sources.
Thus, the sole untrusted relay is necessary for the two-way relaying data transmission. A
key assumption 1 we make here is that the sources have perfect knowledge of the jamming
1We can guarantee this by using some pseudo-random codes which are known to both the friendly jammers and the
sources but not open to the malicious relay. Beyond this, we can also use some cryptographic signals at the friendly
jammers for jamming, where the decryption book is a secret key only open to the sources. Then the sources can have a
perfect knowledge of the jamming signals if each jammer sends some additional bits consisting of the information of the
jamming signal transmitted (e.g., which code or which encryption method to be used). The information that needs to be
sent is for one time, which will lead to trivial bandwidth cost.
5signals transmitted by the friendly jammers, for they have paid for the service.
Let s1, s2, and sJi , i ∈ N , denote the signal to be transmitted by the source S1, S2, and the
jammers Ji, i ∈ N , respectively. Suppose source nodes S1 and S2 transmit with power p1
and p2, and the channel gains from the source nodes to the relay node are denoted by hSk,R,
k = 1, 2. Each friendly jammer node i transmits with power pJi , and the channel gain from
it to the relay node is denoted by hJi,R, i ∈ N . The channel gain contains the path loss and
the Rayleigh fading coefficient with zero mean and unit variance. For simplicity, we assume
that the fading coefficients are constant over one frame, and vary independently from one
frame to another.
In phase 1, the received signal at the malicious relay can be expressed as
yr = nr +
√
p1s1hS1,R +
√
p2s2hS2,R +
∑
i
√
pJi s
J
i hJi,R, (1)
where nr denotes the thermal noise at the relay node R, which is a zero mean Gaussian
random variable with two sided power spectral density of σ2, i.e., CN (0, σ2). Furthermore,
we assume that the noises at S1, S2, and R are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
In phase 2, the malicious relay, which works in AF mode, amplifies the received signal
yr by a factor β and then broadcasts the signal to both S1 and S2 with power pr. The power
normalization factor β at the relay node can be written as
β =
(
p1 |hS1,R| 2 + p2 |hS2,R| 2 +
∑
i
pJi |hJi,R| 2 + σ2
)−1/2
. (2)
Then the corresponding signal received by the source S1 , denoted by y1, can be written as
y1 = β
√
prhS1,Ryr + n1 = ξ1s1 + υ1s2 +
∑
i
µ1,is
J
i + ω1, (3)
where ξ1 , β
√
prp1h
2
S1,R
, υ1 , β
√
prp2hS1,RhS2,R, µ1,i , β
√
prp
J
i hJi,RhS1,R, and ω1 ,
β
√
prhS1,Rnr + n1. Similarly, the signal received by the source S2, denoted by y2, can be
written as
y2 = β
√
prhS2,Ryr + n2 = ξ2s1 + υ2s2 +
∑
i
µ2,is
J
i + ω2, (4)
where ξ2 , β
√
prp1hS1,RhS2,R, υ2 , β
√
prp2h
2
S2,R
, µ2,i , β
√
prp
J
i hJi,RhS2,R, and ω2 ,
β
√
prhS2,Rnr + n2.
Assuming that both the source nodes and the jammer nodes are independent, from (1),
in phase 1, using the matched filter (MF) 2, the untrusted relay node has the capacity with
2For simplicity, we use the matched filter for signal detection [38] while many other advanced detectors can be applied
and the analysis can be done in a similar way.
6respect to S1 and S2 as
Cm1 =
W
2
log

1 + p1gS1,R
σ2 + p2gS2,R +
∑
i
pJi gJi,R

 , (5)
and
Cm2 =
W
2
log

1 + p2gS2,R
σ2 + p1gS1,R +
∑
i
pJi gJi,R

 , (6)
where W represents the channel bandwidth, gS1,R , |hS1,R|2, gS2,R , |hS2,R|2, and gJi,R ,
|hJi,R|2, i ∈ N .
In phase 2, at S1, as s1 as well as sJi is known to the source node, and thus we have
y˜1 = υ1s2 + ω1. (7)
Then, the corresponding SNR for the transmission from S2 to S1, denoted by γ2, can be
expressed as
γ2 =
|υ1|2
V ar {ω1} =
p2gS2,R
σ2 +K2 +
∑
i
σ2gJi,R
prgS1,R
pJi
, (8)
where K2 =
σ2(p1gS1,R+p2gS2,R+σ
2)
prgS1,R
. Similarly, at S2, the received signal with s2 and sJi removed
can be written as
y˜2 = ξ2s1 + ω2. (9)
The corresponding SNR for the transmission from S1 to S2, denoted by γ1, can be expressed
as
γ1 =
|ξ2|2
V ar {ω2} =
p1gS1,R
σ2 +K1 +
∑
i
σ2gJi,R
prgS2,R
pJi
, (10)
where K1 =
σ2(p1gS1,R+p2gS2,R+σ
2)
prgS2,R
.
Capacities of two-way relay channel between the two sources are denoted by C1 and C2,
and we have
C1 =
W
2
log (1 + γ1) , (11)
and
C2 =
W
2
log (1 + γ2) . (12)
Then, the secrecy rate for S1 and S2 [5] can be defined as
Cs1 = (C1 − Cm1 )+, (13)
7and
Cs2 = (C2 − Cm2 )+, (14)
where (x)+ represents max {x, 0}. According to [25] and [26], we have that the defined
secrecy rate is achievable in a two-hop secure communication with an untrusted relay.
As a special case, if the jammers are not used, the jammers’ transmit power pJi should be
set to zero, ∀i ∈ N . Then from the derivation above, we can get the corresponding secrecy
rate in this case as
C˜s1 =
W
2
[
log
(
1 +
p1gS1,R
σ2 +K1
)
− log
(
1 +
p1gS1,R
σ2 + p2gS2,R
)]+
, (15)
and
C˜s2 =
W
2
[
log
(
1 +
p2gS2,R
σ2 +K2
)
− log
(
1 +
p2gS2,R
σ2 + p1gS1,R
)]+
. (16)
In the system we investigate, there is only one intermediate relay, thus this sole relay is
necessary in our assumption for two-way relaying data transmission. Actually, the untrusted
relay has the incentive to forward the signals from both the sources since it can eavesdrop on
the information transmission through this kind of cooperation. If the relay is non-cooperative
that it only receives but not relays the information, then the problem comes to deny-of-service
attack. However, this can be easily detected by the sources, then the non-cooperative relay
will be treated as a thorough eavesdropper and lose the good opportunity to eavesdrop on
the information transmission. The sources will then turn to another intermediate relay for
help to relay their information in a practical scenario where there exist multiple intermediate
relays. In this paper, we focus on the studies how to prevent the untrusted but necessary
intermediate relay from eavesdropping the information, and thus, for simplicity and without
loss of generality, we assume that there is only one necessary intermediate relay in the system
and the relay is cooperative.
III. SECRECY RATE OF TWO-WAY RELAY CHANNEL WITHOUT JAMMERS
For comparison and consistence, we first investigate the special case without the presence
of jammers in this section. We prove that there indeed exists a positive secrecy rate for the
two-way relay channel even without the help of friendly jammers distracting the malicious
relay. Furthermore, we also obtain an optimal power allocation of the sources and the relay
to maximize the secrecy rate. In the next section, we will compare the case with friendly
jammers with this case to expect a positive performance gain in the secrecy rate.
8A. Existence of Non-zero Secrecy Rate
When the eavesdropper channels from the two sources to the malicious relay are degraded
versions of the equivalent main two-way relay channel between S1 and S2, the two sources can
exchange perfectly secure messages at a non-zero rate. Firstly, we consider the transmission
from S1 to S2. In phase 1, the malicious relay receives the signal s1 from S1, which consists of
the information for S2. Meanwhile, S2 also transmits the signal s2 at the relay, which acts as
both the information carrier for S1 and a jamming signal that makes the eavesdropper channel
from S1 to the malicious relay getting worse. In phase 2, the combined signal consisting of
s1 and s2 arrives at S2. As S2 has a perfect knowledge of its own signal s2, the signal that
jammed the malicious relay in phase 1 has no such an effect on S2. Therefore, it makes
possible that the eavesdropper channel is worse than the data transmission channel from S1
to S2, which means that a non-zero rate for secure communication from S1 to S2 is available.
It is the same situation in the transmission from S2 to S1. From (15), (16) and the expressions
of K1 in (10) and K2 in (8), we can write the probability of the existence of a non-zero
secrecy rate as
P
(
C˜s1 > 0, C˜
s
2 > 0
)
= P (K1 < p2gS2,R, K2 < p1gS1,R)
= P
(
pr > max
{
T
p2g
2
S2,R
,
T
p1g
2
S1,R
})
, (17)
where T = (p1gS1,R + p2gS2,R + σ2)σ2.
Considering the power constraints p1 ≤ pmax, p2 ≤ pmax, and pr ≤ pmax, we can get that
there exists at least one pair of (pr, p1, p2) that satisfies pr > max
{
T
p2g2S2,R
, T
p1g2S1,R
}
, under
the channel condition of gS1,R+gS2,R
gS1,RgS2,R
< pmax
σ2
. Therefore, we have P
(
C˜s1 > 0, C˜
s
2 > 0
)
> 0 at
some power vectors of (pr, p1, p2), which actually indicates that a non-zero secrecy rate in
the two-way relay channel is indeed available.
B. Maximizing the Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we try to get an optimal power vector of (pr, p1, p2) which maximizes
the secrecy rate of the two-way relay channel. We can formulate the problem subject to the
individual secrecy rate constraints and power constraints as
max C˜s = max
2∑
k=1
C˜sk, (18)
s.t.

 C˜
s
1 > 0, C˜
s
2 > 0
p1 ≤ pmax, p2 ≤ pmax, pr ≤ pmax
.
9From (17), we have that
C˜s1 > 0, C˜
s
2 > 0⇔ pr > max
{
T
p2g
2
S2,R
,
T
p1g
2
S1,R
}
. (19)
From (15), (16), and (18), we can get that
C˜s =
W
2
(
log F˜ (pr, p1, p2)
)+
, (20)
where
F˜ (pr, p1, p2) ,
(
1 +
p1gS1,R
σ2+K1
)(
1 +
p2gS2,R
σ2+K2
)
(
1 +
p1gS1,R
σ2+p2gS2,R
)(
1 +
p2gS2,R
σ2+p1gS1,R
) . (21)
As F˜ (pr, p1, p2) has the same monotonic property as C˜s under the conditions of (18), we
can transform the optimization problem as
max F˜ (pr, p1, p2) , (22)
s.t.


pr > max
{
T
p2g2S2,R
, T
p1g2S1,R
}
p1 ≤ pmax, p2 ≤ pmax, pr ≤ pmax
.
It can be calculated that ∂F˜ (pr,p1,p2)
∂pr
> 0 is always established under the conditions of (22),
which implies that F˜ (pr, p1, p2) is a monotonically increasing function of pr. Therefore,
when maximizing the secrecy rate C˜s, pr opt = pmax, where pr opt denotes the optimal relay
power 3. As a result, the problem can be further transformed into max F˜ (pmax, p1, p2).
The optimal solutions of p1 and p2 when maximizing the secrecy rate can be easily obtained
under different conditions (i.e., gS1,R > gS2,R, gS1,R < gS2,R, and gS1,R = gS2,R) through the
Lagrangian method by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [43]. In this paper,
subject to the space limit, we omit the detailed computing process and only give the results
of the optimal solutions of p1 and p2 as:
1) For the case that gS1,R > gS2,R, it yields that p2 opt = pmax. Meanwhile, if there exists
a solution p∗1 ∈ (0, pmax] that satisfies the equation ∂F˜ (pmax,p1,pmax)∂p1 = 0, then we have
p1 opt = p
∗
1. Otherwise, we have p1 opt = pmax. Here p1 opt and p2 opt denote the optimal
power transmitted by S1 and S2, respectively.
2) For the case that gS1,R < gS2,R, it yields that p1 opt = pmax. Meanwhile, if there exists
a solution p∗2 ∈ (0, pmax] that satisfies the equation ∂F˜ (pmax,pmax,p2)∂p2 = 0, then we have
p2 opt = p
∗
2. Otherwise, we have p2 opt = pmax.
3) For the case that gS1,R = gS2,R, we have that p1 opt = pmax, and p2 opt = pmax.
3Note that here we calculate the optimal power solution of pr only from a mathematical perspective to maximize the
secrecy rate. In fact, the intermediate relay has no incentive to transmit with the maximum power.
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In addition, we verify these optimal solutions by simulations in different cases which is
shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 in Section-V, and after further calculation based on the simulation
results, we can get that the results agree with the optimal power solutions well.
IV. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY WITH FRIENDLY JAMMERS
In this section, through further analysis, we first find that the secrecy rate of the sources can
be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then,
the problem comes to how to control the jamming power from different friendly jammers
when optimizing the secrecy rate of the sources. In general, in a cooperative wireless network
with selfish nodes, nodes may not serve a common goal or belong to a single authority. Thus,
a mechanism of reimbursement to the friendly jammers should be employed such that the
friendly jammers can earn benefits from spending their own transmitting power in helping the
sources for secure data transmission. For the source side, the sources aim to achieve the best
performance of secrecy rate with the friendly jammers’ help with the least reimbursements
to them. For the friendly jammer side, each friendly jammer aims to earn the payment not
only covers its transmitting cost but also gains as many extra profits as possible. Therefore,
we employ a Stackelberg game model [32] as a power control scheme jointly considering
both the benefits of the sources and the friendly jammers. In the Stackelberg game model we
proposed, the two sources as a unity is the sole buyer that starts the process of the proposed
Stackelberg game, and the friendly jammers are the sellers, therefore, the sources are treated
as leader while the friendly jammers are the followers. Furthermore, the optimal solutions of
the jamming power and asking price are investigated and a corresponding distributed updating
algorithm is provided. Finally, a centralized scheme is proposed for performance comparison.
A. Secrecy Rate Improvement using Friendly Jammers
From (13) and (14), we have
Cs1 =
W
2

log

1 + p1gS1,R
σ2 +K1 +
∑
i
σ2gJi,R
prgS2,R
pJi


− log

1 + p1gS1,R
σ2 + p2gS2,R +
∑
i
gJi,Rp
J
i




+
, (23)
11
and
Cs2 =
W
2

log

1 + p2gS2,R
σ2 +K2 +
∑
i
σ2gJi,R
prgS1,R
pJi


− log

1 + p2gS2,R
σ2 + p1gS1,R +
∑
i
gJi,Rp
J
i




+
. (24)
From (23) and (24), we can see that both Ck and Cmk , k = 1, 2, are decreasing and convex
functions of jamming power pJi , i ∈ N . However, if Cmk decreases faster than Ck as the
jamming power pJi increases, Csk might increase in some region of value pJi . But when pJi
further increases, both Ck and Cmk will approach zero. As a result, Csk approaches zero.
Compared to (15) and (16), we can get that if σ2gJi,R
prgS2,R
< gJi,R and
σ2gJi,R
prgS1,R
< gJi,R, ∀i ∈ N ,
i.e., σ2
pr
< min {gS1,R, gS2,R}, the gain of the secrecy rate will be above zero in some region
of the jamming power pJi . Then the problem comes to how to utilize the jamming power
from different friendly jammers effectively to maximize the secrecy rate. Thus, we propose
a Stackelberg game model to achieve effective jamming power control in the following
subsections.
Note that synchronization among the sources and the friendly jammers is important in
the investigated system with friendly jammers. Many works have been devoted to the syn-
chronization issues among distributed nodes in cooperative networks, for example in [44],
[45], effective synchronization schemes among distributed sensors and cooperative relays
with low complexity and good performance were proposed. Thus, the synchronization issue
among the sources and the friendly jammers can be addressed effectively using methods
similar to those proposed in [44], [45]. However, this is not the key investigated issue in this
paper, therefore, we assume that perfect synchronization among the sources and the friendly
jammers is implemented in the system.
B. Source Side Game
We consider the two sources as two buyers who want to optimize their secrecy rates, while
the cost paid for the “service”, i.e., jamming power pJi , i ∈ N , should also be taken into
consideration. For the source side we can define the utility function as
Us = a (C
s
1 + C
s
2)−M, (25)
where a is a positive constant representing the economic gain per unit rate of confidential
data transmission between the two sources, and M is the cost to pay for the friendly jammers.
12
Here we have
M =
∑
i∈N
mip
J
i , (26)
where mi is the price per unit power paid for the friendly jammer i by the sources, i ∈ N .
When considering the optimal transmitting power vector of source S1 and S2, i.e., (p1, p2)
to achieve the maximum utility value in (25), we can treat the jamming power pJi , i ∈ N , as
constants since all the nodes transmit with independent power. Thus, we can obtain similar
results of optimal power solutions as given in Subsection-III-B. But to obtain the optimal
solutions of p1 and p2 is not our main purpose here. In this subsection, we formulate the
source side game to study how to effectively utilize the jamming power from different friendly
jammers in order to achieve the maximum utility value.
Then the source side game can be expressed as
max Us = max (a (C
s
1 + C
s
2)−M) , (27)
s.t.

 C
s
1 ≥ 0, Cs2 ≥ 0
0 ≤ pJi ≤ pmax, pr = pmax, f ixed p1, p2
.
The goal of the sources as buyers is to buy the optimal amount of power from the friendly
jammers in order to maximize the secrecy rate. From (23), (24), and (27), we have
Us =
aW
2

log
1 + 1
A1+
∑
i
T1,ipJi
1 + 1
B1+
∑
i
L1,ipJi
+ log
1 + 1
A2+
∑
i
T2,ipJi
1 + 1
B2+
∑
i
L2,ipJi

−∑
i
mip
J
i , (28)
where A1 , σ
2+K1
p1gS1,R
, A2 ,
σ2+K2
p2gS2,R
, B1 ,
σ2+p2gS2,R
p1gS1,R
, B2 ,
σ2+p1gS1,R
p2gS2,R
, T1,i ,
σ2gJi,R
prp1gS2,RgS1,R
,
T2,i ,
σ2gJi,R
prp2gS2,RgS1,R
, L1,i ,
gJi,R
p1gS1,R
, and L2,i ,
gJi,R
p2gS2,R
, i ∈ N .
By differentiating (28) with respect to pJi , we have
∂Us
∂pJi
=− aWT1,i
2
(
A1 +
∑
i
T1,ip
J
i
)(
1 + A1 +
∑
i
T1,ip
J
i
)
+
aWL1,i
2
(
B1 +
∑
i
L1,ip
J
i
)(
1 +B1 +
∑
i
L1,ip
J
i
)
− aWT2,i
2
(
A2 +
∑
i
T2,ip
J
i
)(
1 + A2 +
∑
i
T2,ip
J
i
)
+
aWL2,i
2
(
B2 +
∑
i
L2,ip
J
i
)(
1 +B2 +
∑
i
L2,ip
J
i
) −mi. (29)
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Rearranging the above equation, when ∂Us
∂pJi
= 0, we can get an eighth order polynomial
equation as
(
pJi
)8
+ Fi,7
(
pJi
)7
+ Fi,6
(
pJi
)6
+ Fi,5
(
pJi
)5
+ Fi,4
(
pJi
)4
+Fi,3
(
pJi
)3
+ Fi,2
(
pJi
)2
+ Fi,1p
J
i + Fi,0 = 0, (30)
where Fi,l, l = 0, 1, . . . , 7, are formulae of constants Ak, Bk, Ti,k, Li,k, and variables pJj ,
k = 1, 2, i ∈ N , j ∈ N but j 6= i.
The solutions to the high order equation (30) can be expressed in closed form, but the
expressions of the solutions are extremely complex and have little necessity for our following
work. Actually, what to our particular interest are not the closed-form expressions of the
optimal jamming power, but the parameters that affect these optimal solutions. Thus, the
optimal jamming power solution can be expressed as
pJi
∗
= pJi
∗
(
mi, {Ak} , {Bk} , {Tk,i} , {Lk,i} ,
{
pJj
}
j 6=i
)
, (31)
which is a function of the friendly jammer’s price mi, the other jammers’ jamming power{
pJj
}
j 6=i
, and other system parameters. Noting that there may be up to eight roots of the
polynomial equation (30), the selected solution should be a real root and can lead to a higher
value of Us in (28) than the other real ones. Subject to the power constraints 0 ≤ pJi ≤ pmax
in the game, we can get the optimal strategy as
pJi opt = min
(
max
(
pJi
∗
, 0
)
, pmax
)
. (32)
If there are no real roots of the equation (30), then the optimal strategy will be either pJi opt = 0
or pJi opt = pmax according to which one can achieve a larger Us when other parameters are
settled.
Because of the high complexity of the solutions to the high order equation in (31), we
further consider a special high interference case to obtain a simple expression of the optimal
solution. In this special case, we assume that there is one jammer staying very close to the
malicious relay, so that the interference from the jammer is much stronger than the power of
the received signals from the sources at the relay. Meanwhile, we also assume that the received
signal power is much higher than the additive noise, i.e., high signal-to-noise ratio, which
means σ2 ≪ p1gS1,R ≪ pJ1gJ1,R and σ2 ≪ p2gS2,R ≪ pJ1gJ1,R. Then, we have σ
2
p1gS1,R
≪ 1,
σ2
p2gS2,R
≪ 1, σ2
pJ
1
gJ1,R
≪ 1, p1gS1,R
pJ
1
gJ1,R
≪ 1, and p1gS1,R
pJ
1
gJ1,R
≪ 1. We assume all the left sides of these
inequalities which are much smaller than 1 approach zero. Therefore, the utility function of
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the source side in (25) can be approximately calculated as
Us ≈aW
2
(
log
(
1 +
prp1gS1,RgS2,R
σ2pJ1gJ1,R
)
− log
(
1 +
p1gS1,R
pJ1gJ1,R
)
+ log
(
1 +
prp2gS1,RgS2,R
σ2pJ1gJ1,R
)
− log
(
1 +
p2gS2,R
pJ1gJ1,R
))
−m1pJ1
≈aW
2
(
prp1gS1,RgS2,R
σ2pJ1gJ1,R
− p1gS1,R
pJ1gJ1,R
+
prp2gS1,RgS2,R
σ2pJ1gJ1,R
− p2gS2,R
pJ1gJ1,R
)
−m1pJ1
=
aW
2
((prgS2,R
σ2
− 1
) p1gS1,R
gJ1,R
+
(prgS1,R
σ2
− 1
) p2gS2,R
gJ1,R
)
1
pJ1
−m1pJ1
=−D1 1
pJ1
−m1pJ1 , (33)
where D1 = aW2
[(
1− prgS2,R
σ2
) p1gS1,R
gJ1,R
+
(
1− prgS1,R
σ2
) p2gS2,R
gJ1,R
]
and the second approximation
comes from the Taylor series expansion log (1 + x) ≈ x when x is small enough 4. It can
be easily observed that if D1 < 0, Us is a decreasing function of pJ1 . As a result, Us can be
optimized when pJ1 = 0, i.e., the jammer would not play in the game. If D1 > 0, in order to
find the optimal power for the sources to buy, we can calculate
∂Us
∂pJ1
=
D1
(pJ1 )
2 −m1 = 0. (34)
Hence, the optimal closed-form solution can be expressed as
pJ1
∗
=
√
D1
m1
. (35)
By comparing pJ1
∗
with the power under the boundary conditions, we can obtain the optimal
solution of the source side game for this special case as
pJ1 opt = min
(
pJ1
∗
, pmax
)
. (36)
In Section-V, we employ the general case setups for simulation. The results indicates that
the sources always prefer to buying power from only one jammer when there exists at least
one sufficiently-effective jammer, which is more effective to perform jamming than the other
jammers and is simultaneously asking for a proper price. Therefore, this special case with one
jammer experiencing severe interference is valid in analyzing the proposed game. Under this
special case, we can get a property of the proposed game that the optimal power consumption
pJ1
∗ is a monotonous function of its price m1, which could help to prove the existence of
the equilibrium in Subsection-IV-D. We can also prove that the friendly jammer power pJ1 ∗
bought from the sources is convex in the price m1 under some conditions.
From (35), we have the first order derivative of pJ1 ∗ as
∂pJ1
∗
∂m1
= −1
2
√
D1m
− 3
2
1 , (37)
4Here we say x is small enough means the high order of x approaches zero.
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and the second order derivative as
∂2pJ1
∗
∂m1
=
3
4
√
D1m
− 5
2
1 > 0, (38)
which indicates in the high interference case, the optimal power pJ1
∗ is a convex function of
the price m1.
C. Friendly Jammer Side Game
For each friendly jammer, we can define the utility function as
Ui = mi
(
pJi
)ci
, (39)
where ci ≥ 1 is a constant to balance the payment mipJi from the sources and the transmission
cost pJi of the jammer itself, i ∈ N . With different values of ci, the jammers have different
strategies for asking the price mi. Here, the jamming power pJi is also a function of the
vector of prices (m1, m2, . . . , mN), as the amount of jamming power that the sources will
buy also depends on the prices that the friendly jammers ask. Hence, the friendly jammer
side game can be expressed as
max
mi
Ui. (40)
The goal of each friendly jammer as a seller is to set an optimal price in order to maximize
its utility. By differentiating the utility in (39) and setting it to zero, we can get
∂Ui
∂mi
=
(
pJi opt
)ci
+mici
(
pJi opt
)ci−1∂pJi opt
∂mi
= 0, (41)
which is equivalent to solve
(
pJi opt
)ci−1(
pJi opt +mici
∂pJi opt
∂mi
)
= 0. (42)
The equation (42) can be solved by setting either pJi opt = 0 or
pJi opt +mici
∂pJi opt
∂mi
= 0. (43)
Hence, with the optimal solution pJi opt, we can get the solution of the optimal price mi opt
as a function given as
mi opt = m
∗
i
{
σ2, gS1,R, gS2,R, {gJi,R}
}
, (44)
where mi opt should be positive; otherwise, the friendly jammer would not participate the
game, i ∈ N .
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D. Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Proposed Game
In this subsection, we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, at
which neither the sources nor each friendly jammer can further improve its utility by changing
its own strategy only. From the game definitions of the source side in (27) and the friendly
jammer side in (40), we can define the Stackelberg equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1: pJi SE and mi SE are the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, if
when mi is fixed,
Us
({
pJi SE
})
= sup
0≤{pJi }≤pmax,∀i
Us
({
pJi
})
, ∀i ∈ N , (45)
and when pJi is fixed,
Ui (mi SE) = sup
mi
Ui (mi) , ∀i ∈ N . (46)
From the analysis in the previous two subsections, we have that
{
pJi opt
}N
i=1
in (32) and
{mi opt}Ni=1 in (44) are the optimal solutions of the jamming power needed by the sources
and the asking prices given by the friendly jammers when solving the utility optimization
problem in (27) and (40). And thus, we can obtain the property that the pair of {pJi opt}Ni=1
and {mi opt}Ni=1 is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game.
We can easily prove this property theoretically in the special high interference case with
one efficient friendly jammer close to the untrusted relay. In Subsection-IV-B, we have proved
that in this special case, the optimal jamming power solution pJ1 opt bought from the efficient
friendly jammer 1 is monotone decreasing and convex with the asking price m1, when the
other friendly jammers’ prices are fixed. And in this case, the sources would prefer to buy the
jamming power only from the efficient friendly jammer. Therefore, we can obtain that there
exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium that are just the optimal solutions of the jamming
power and the asking prices. However, due to the extremely complex closed-form expressions
of the optimal solutions, for more general cases, the proof in theory is intractable, and thus
instead, we prove by simulations in Section-V that the proposed game can effectively converge
to a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, which are the optimal solutions of the jamming power
and the asking price when maximizing the utilities of the sources and the friendly jammers.
E. Distributed Updating Algorithm
In this subsection, we construct a corresponding distributed updating algorithm for the
proposed game to converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium defined above. By rearranging
(43), we have
mi = Ii (m) = −
(
pJi opt
)
ci
∂pJi opt
∂mi
, (47)
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where m = [m1, m2, . . . , mN ]T , pJi opt is a function of m, and Ii (m) is the price update
function for friendly jammer i, i ∈ N . The information for updating can be obtained from
the sources, which is similar to the distributed power allocation [40]. The distributed algorithm
can be expressed in a vector form as
m (t+ 1) = I (m (t)) , (48)
where I = [I1, I2, ..., IN ]T , and the iteration is from time t to time t + 1.
Furthermore, we can get the convergence of the proposed scheme by proving that the
update function in (48) is a standard function [41] defined as
Definition 2: A function I (m) is standard, if for all m ≥ 0, the following properties are
satisfied
1) Positivity: I (m) ≥ 0,
2) Monotonicity: if m ≥ m′, then I (m) ≥ I (m′), or I (m) ≤ I (m′),
3) Scalability: For all η > 1, ηI (m) ≥ I (ηm).
Similarly as the situation in [41], we can get that each friendly jammer’s price will converge
to a fixed point, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium in our game, from any feasible initial
price vector m (0). The positivity of the update function is easy to prove. We know that if
the price mi goes up, the sources would buy less from the friendly jammer i. Therefore,
∂pJi opt
∂mi
in (47) is negative, and we can prove the positivity of the price update function as
Ii (m) = − (p
J
i opt)
ci
∂pJ
i opt
∂mi
> 0, ∀i ∈ N .
Because of the complexity of the optimal solutions in (32) and (44), the monotonicity and
scalability can only be shown in the high interference case. From (35) and (47), we have the
update function as
I1 (m) = −
(
pJ1
∗)
c1
∂pJ
1
∗
∂m1
= −
√
D1
m1
− c1
2
√
D1m
− 3
2
1
=
2m1
c1
, (49)
which is monotonically increasing with the price m1 and scalable.
For more general cases, the analysis is intractable. But in Section-V, we employ the general
case setups for simulation and the results show that the proposed distributed game scheme
can converge and outperform the case without jammers.
F. Centralized Scheme for Comparison
Traditionally, the centralized scheme is employed assuming that all the channel information
is known. In this subsection, we formulate the centralized problem by optimizing the secrecy
18
rate with respect to the constraints of maximal jamming power pmax.
max
pJi
Cs = max
pJi
(Cs1 + C
s
2) , (50)
s.t. 0 ≤ pJi ≤ pmax, ∀i ∈ N ,
where Cs1 and Cs2 are obtained from (23) and (24), respectively. The centralized solution is
found by maximizing the secrecy rate only.
In Section-V, we compare the proposed distributed algorithm with this centralized scheme.
From the simulation results, we can see that the distributed solution and the centralized
solution are asymptotically the same when the unit rate’s gain a in (27) is sufficiently large.
However, the distributed solution only needs to update the difference of the power and price
to be adaptive, while the centralized solution requires all channel information in each time
slot. Therefore, the distributed algorithm is more efficient in practical applications.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To investigate the performances, we conduct the following simulations. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we consider a two-way relay system where the sources S1, S2, and
the malicious relay R are located at the coordinate (−1, 0), (1, 0), and (0, 0), respectively.
The other simulation parameters are set up as follows: The maximum power constraint pmax
is 10; the transmission bandwidth is 1; the noise variance is σ2 = 0.01; Rayleigh fading
channel is assumed, where the channel gain consists of the path loss and the Rayleigh fading
coefficient; the path loss factor is 2. Here, we select a = 1 for the source side utility in (27).
For the special case without jammers, we set the jamming power up to zero. In Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3, we show the secrecy rate as a function of the two sources’ transmitting power p1 and
p2 in this special case. It shows that the optimal power vector of (p1, p2) is (0.22pmax, pmax)
when gS1,R = 0.3857 and gS2,R = 0.0443, and (pmax, 0.32pmax) when gS1,R = 0.0508 and
gS2,R = 0.3018. After further calculation, we can see that the results agree with the optimal
power allocation conclusions given in Section III.
For the single-jammer case, we consider two jammer locations which are (0.3, 0.4) and
(0.6, 0.8). Fig. 4 shows the secrecy rate as a function of the jamming power when p1, p2,
and pr are all set up to pmax. We can see that with the increase of the jamming power, the
secrecy rate first increases and then decreases. There indeed exists an optimal point for the
jamming power. Also the optimal point depends on the location of the friendly jammer, and
we can find that the friendly jammer close to the malicious relay is more effective to improve
the secrecy rate. Fig. 5 shows that the optimal amount of the jamming power bought by the
sources depends on the price requested by the friendly jammer. We can see that the amount
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of bought power gets reduced if the price goes high and the sources would even stop buying
after some price point. And thus there is a tradeoff for the jammers to set the price. If the
price is set too high, the sources would buy less power or even stop buying.
For the multiple-jammer case, we consider two jammers which are located at (0.3, 0.4)
and (0.5, 0.5), respectively. Note that in the simulations of this scenario the jammers are both
sufficiently-effective ones. Here we define jammer i as a sufficiently-effective one if it on
its own can offer a power pJi , pJi ∈ (0, pmax], making the secrecy rate improved up to the
maximal value. In Fig. 6, Fig. 7, Fig. 8, and Fig. 9, the secrecy rate Cs, the sources’ utility Us,
the first jammer’s utility U1, and the second jammer’s utility U2 as functions of both jammers’
prices are shown, respectively. In Fig. 6, we can see that there exists an upper bound and
a lower bound for the secrecy rate when the channel conditions are settled. When one of
the two jammers’ prices is low enough, the sources could buy sufficient jamming power
from the jammer to improve the secrecy rate up to the upper bound. When both jammers’
prices are beyond the sources’ payment ability, the secrecy rate would stay at the lower
bound which is the same as the case without jammers as the sources no longer buy jamming
power from the jammers. In Fig. 7, we can see that if at least one of the two jammers sets
a low price, the sources’ utility is high as the sources could get a high secrecy rate at a
low cost from the jammer with low asking price. With both jammers’ prices going high,
the sources’ utility decreases. When the prices of both jammers are so high that the sources
cannot benefit any more from the jamming service at the high cost, the sources would stop
buying. In Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, we can find that under this condition (i.e., both of the jammers
are sufficiently-effective ones) the sources would always prefer to buying service from only
one of the friendly jammers for the best performance. The selected jammer is either more
effective to improve the secrecy rate when the prices of the jammers are comparable, or the
one whose asking price is low enough. For the friendly jammer side, if the jammer asks
too low price, the jammer’s utility is very low. But if the jammer asks too high price, the
sources might buy the service from the other friendly jammer. Therefore, there is an optimal
price for each friendly jammer to ask, and the sources would always select the one which
can provide the best performance improvement.
For the multiple-jammer case, we also discuss how the optimal secrecy rate changes with
the number of jammers increasing. We conduct simulations under two different scenarios,
i.e., there exists at least one sufficiently-effective jammer and there is no sufficiently-effective
jammer. Here no sufficiently-effective jammer means that the sources could not achieve the
maximal secrecy rate with only one jammer’s help. Therefore, the sources have to first sort
the current friendly jammers in an order of effectiveness, and then buy jamming power from
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the most effective jammer one by one until the secrecy rate reaches the maximal value. From
(23) and (24), we can get that if the channel information and the transmitting power of the
sources and the relay are settled, the maximal achievable secrecy rate will not change, no
matter how many jammers are used and how much jamming power bought by the sources
from each jammer. For the non-sufficiently-effective jammer scenario, we set the jammer i
located at (xi, yi), i ∈ N , where x2i+y2i > 4. In Fig. 10, the optimal secrecy rate as a function
of number of friendly jammers is shown. We can see that if there exists sufficiently-effective
jammers, the optimal secrecy rate does not change as the number of jammers increases. For
the sources, they always choose the most effective jammer to achieve the maximal secrecy
rate, when additional jamming power from other jammers would decrease the optimal secrecy
rate. In other words, in this scenario, the optimal secrecy rate can reach the maximal value
with the most effective jammer’s help only. On the other hand, if there are no sufficiently-
effective jammers, the optimal secrecy rate will be improved up to the maximal value as the
number of jammers increases.
Finally, we compare the distributed solution with the centralized solution of secrecy rate.
In Fig. 11, we show the optimal secrecy rate of both the distributed and centralized schemes
as a function of the gain factor a in (25) with the friendly jammer located at (1, 1). When a
is large, the sources would care the gain of secrecy rate more than the jamming service cost
in the game theoretical scheme. We can see that the performance gap between the distributed
and centralized solutions of optimal secrecy rate is shrinking as a is increasing. And the
solutions are asymptotically the same when a is sufficiently large.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the physical layer security for two-way relay communi-
cations with untrusted relay and friendly jammers. As a simple case, a two-way relay system
without jammers is first studied, and an optimal power allocation vector of the sources and
relay nodes is found. We then investigated the secrecy rate in the presence of friendly jammers.
Furthermore, we defined and analyzed a Stackelberg type of game between the sources and
the friendly jammers to achieve the optimal secrecy rate in a distributed way. Finally, we
obtained a distributed solution for the proposed game. From the simulation results we can get
the following conclusions. First, a non-zero secrecy rate for two-way relay channel is indeed
available. Second, the secrecy rate can be improved with the help of friendly jammers, and
there is an optimal solution of jamming power allocation. Third, there is also a tradeoff for
the price a jammer sets, and if the price is too high, the sources will turn to buying from
others. For the game, we can see that the distributed algorithm and the centralized scheme
have similar performances, especially when the gain factor is sufficiently large.
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Fig. 1. System model for two-way relay communications with friendly jammers
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate vs. p1 and p2 for the case without jammers when gS1,R > gS2,R
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate vs. p1 and p2 for the case without jammers when gS1,R < gS2,R
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Fig. 5. How much jamming power the sources buy as a function of the jammer price
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Fig. 6. Secrecy rate Cs vs. the prices of both jammers
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Fig. 7. The sources’ utility Us vs. the prices of both jammers
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Fig. 8. The jammer 1’s utility U1 vs. the prices of both jammers
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Fig. 9. The jammer 2’s utility U2 vs. the prices of both jammers
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